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ECONOMICS AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Karl Gleaves and Katharine Wellman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act of 19731 (ESA or the Act) is one of our
nation's strongest and most controversial environmental laws. Often the
controversy is framed as "species versus economics." There have been
numerous debates on topics such as the snail darter versus the one-hundred
million dollar Tellico dam project,2 sea turtles versus the economic survival
of shrimp fishermen and the shrimp industry, the northern spotted owl
versus thousands of timber-related jobs, and Pacific salmon in the West
and Northwest versus significant economic consequences for utilities,
farmers and other water users. This article focuses on the role of economics
in the ESA.
The ESA is commonly seen as precluding consideration of economic
factors.3 This common impression is overly simplistic. Economic consider-
ations are legitimate and appropriate at certain stages of the ESA process.
Section II of this article generally describes the ESA and reviews six
determinations or actions that occur as a part of the ESA process. Both the
permissibility and the utility of considering economic factors at each stage
are analyzed.
Faced with the need for a methodological approach that can deal with
the inevitable economic questions and uncertainties encountered under the
ESA process, Section III of this article considers several models. These
models address the need for an explicit and objective method for evaluating
economic benefits and costs associated with species preservation and
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1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
2. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (cited in this article as TVA v.
Hill).
3. For example, see the editorial Species Act, Endangered, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1992, at A12;
Charles Mann & Mark Plummer, The Noah Principle, N.Y. TiMas, May 11, 1992, at A15.
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should be used at appropriate stages in the ESA process. Section III
outlines several economic evaluation approaches and their potential
application, using the listing of salmon in the Columbia River Basin as an
illustration.
II. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS AND CONSIDERATIONS
General Description of the ESA
The ESA is jointly administered by the Secretary of Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce. Most responsibilities are delegated to the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), respectively I The ESA protects a group of fish, wildlife, or
plants if that group is listed as an "endangered species" 5 or as a
"threatened species." 6 The Act also provides for the designation of critical
habitat. 7 Among the ESA's most significant provisions are the protections
of Section 7 This section requires that federal agencies, in consultation
with FWS or NMFS, ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of a listed species or to destroy or adversely modify
critical habitat." Section 9 prohibits certain actions, such as the taking of
endangered fish and wildlife.' In most cases, similar restrictions apply to
threatened species.10 Unlike Section 7, these prohibitions are not limited to
agency actions but apply to all persons subject to the laws of the United
States.
4. See the definition of "Secretary" in 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15). FWS is an agency within the
Department of Interior while NMFS is a part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, an agency within the Department of Commerce. The Secretary of Commerce has responsibility
for "any species over which program responsibilities have been vested in the Secretary of Commerce
pursuant to Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970." § 4(a)(2); see Reorganization Plan No. 4 of
1970, 84 Stat. 2090 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. Appendix 1 (Supp. 1992); see also Memorandum
of Understanding Regarding Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Listing Procedures under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (August 28, 1974) (NMFS has responsibility for most marine species
and FWS has responsibility for birds, terrestrial species, and some marine species).
5. This term is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
6. This term is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20); the listing process is prescribed in § 4; see also 50
C.F.R. § 424 (1990).
7. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
8. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) and 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1990).
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
10. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (199 1); see also Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608,612-13 (8th Cir.
1985) (FWS may not allow the sport trapping of the threatened eastern timber wolf, absent
extraordinary circumstances) and Fund for Animals v. Turner, No. 91-2201, memorandum opinion
(D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 27, 1991) (federal defendants enjoined from authorizing the sport hunting of
grizzly bears). See also DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS
PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 75 (1989) ("Secretary will almost always be required to apply all
of sectinn 9's restrictions to threatened species as well").
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Proposed and Final Listing Decisions
Typically, the ESA process begins when the Service (FWS or NMFS)
reviews the status of a species, either on its own initiative or in response to a
petition for the listing of a species if the petition presents substantial
information supporting the listing of the species. The Act does not specify a
time frame within which the process must be completed if the Service
initiates the status review However, if the Service responds to a petition, a
proposed listing decision is required within one year. A final listing decision
is required within two years. These time limits can be extended in limited
circumstances.11
Economics are not relevant and cannot be considered as a part of the
listing process. These determinations must be made "solely on the basis of
the best scientific and commercial data available "12 The legislative
history of the 1982 amendments is explicit, "[E]conomic considerations
have no relevance to determinations regarding the status of a species
",13
Consequently, the listing process is exempt from various laws and
executive orders that otherwise require an economic analysis. 4 For
example, in litigation the government indicated that former President
Bush's moratorium on rule-making did not apply to ESA listing actions.'
5
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (Sept. 17,
1982); see also § 4(b)(6) and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 835 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (Sept. 17, 1982).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added); "solely" was added by the 1982 Amend-
ments, Pub. L. 97-304,102 Stat. 2306. The use of the "word 'commercial' is not intended, in anyway, to
authorize the use of economic considerations in the process of listing a species." H.R. Rep. No. 597,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1982). The term is used to allow for the use of trade data. Id. The legislative
history of the 1982 amendments is clear that the purpose of these amendments is to ensure that
"decisions in every phase of the process pertaining to the listing or delisting of species are based solely
on biological criteria and to prevent non-biological considerations from affecting such decisions."
Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982).
13. Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 835, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982)(emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(Supp. 1992); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988); Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980, as amended, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988).
The Conference Report states: "[T] he economic analysis requirements of Executive Order 1229 1,
and such statutes as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act, will not apply to
any phase of the listing process." Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 835, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess 20
(1982).
Similarly, listing actions should not be subject to the requirements of Exec. Order No. 12612, 52 Fed.
Reg. 41,685 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (Suppl. 1992). But see Exec. Order No. 12630, 53
Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (Supp. 1992) and Appendix IV oftheAtt'y Gen
Suppl. Guidelines for the Dept. of Interior (March 29, 1989) (Takings Implications Assessment
required for most listings under the ESA). See also Att'y Gen Suppl. Guidelines for the Dept. of
Commerce (April 23, 1990).
15. See the declaration of Bruce Blanchard and attached exhibits filed by the Government on
Apr. 3, 1992, in Carleton v. Lujan, No. 92-0800 (D.D.C. complaint and motion for temporary
restraining order filed Apr. 2, 1992).
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In addition, the ESA listing process is exempt from the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).'6
Proposed and Final Critical Habitat Designations
Under the ESA, critical habitat should be designated at the time of
the final listing of a species, but can be delayed up to one year 17 The first
step in designating critical habitat consists of defining the physical and
biological features essential to the conservation of the species and deter-
mining whether these features need special management considerations
and protections."'
The designation of critical habitat also involves a second step in which
areas may be excluded if the benefits of the exclusion outweigh the benefits
of specifying the area as part of the critical habitat. 19 Economics should be
considered in the critical habitat designation process. "The Secretary shall
designate critical habitat on the basis of the best scientific data available
after taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other
relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat."20
Clearly, the consideration of economic impacts is required prior to the
final designation of critical habitat. Despite the language, the joint NMFS
and FWS regulations appear to permit proposed designations to go
forward prior to completion of the economic analysis.2 ' FWS was
threatened with litigation in the spotted owl controversy because of its
failure to provide adequate notice and opportunity for public comment on
the economic analysis component of the proposed critical habitat designa-
tion.22 Subsequently, FWS re-proposed critical habitat including an
16. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). See Pacific
Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981) (Secretary does not have discretion to
consider factors specified under NEPA in the ESA listing process). See also NOAA Administrative
Order 216-6 Environmental Review Procedures (August 6, 1991) at 14; 49 Fed. Reg. 29,652 (1984). In
addition, see FWS Guidance on the Application of NEPA to the ESA and MMPA (September 10,
1991); 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6). Until recently, many critical habitat designations were delayed
using the rationale that critical habitat was not determinable at the time of listing. A recent decision
indicates that delays are appropriate only under limited circumstances and that this one-year extension
should not be considered automatic. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash.
1991).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A); see also 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (1991). Critical habitat includes
specific areas within the geographic area occupied by the species at the time of listing; not all these areas
will be designated nor will the designation include areas outside these areas, except under certain
circumstances. § 3(5)(A)(i) and (C).
19. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (1991).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (emphasis added).
21. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.16; this issue also is discussed in the preamble material at 49 Fed. Reg.
38,906-7 (1984).
22. 56 Fed. Reg. 20,816 (1991).
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analysis of economic impacts.2"
Additionally, various laws and executive orders that require an
economic analysis apparently apply to the designation of critical habitat. 4
While FWS policy indicates that NEPA does not apply to critical habitat
designation, a recent district court decision held that such designations are
not exempt from NEPA.25
While critical habitat designations must involve the consideration of
economic impacts, evaluating the extent of these economic impacts is
problematic. As interpreted by the Service, the critical habitat designa-
tion, by itself, may have little direct economic impact. Most of the
economic consequences are derived from listing the species and are not
directly attributable to the critical habitat designation. When a species is
listed, prohibitions against the taking of that species usually become
effective, and the no-jeopardy standard of Section 7 becomes applicable to
agency actions. The prohibition on destroying or adversely modifying
critical habitat, as interpreted by regulation, provides protection that is
very similar, if not the same, as the protection provided by the no-jeopardy
standard.26 In addition, the prohibitions under Section 9 and associated
regulations often protect habitat, regardless of whether the habitat is
officially designated as critical.2 The fact that the designation of critical
23. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,002 (199 I); the final designation of critical habitat was published at 57 Fed.
Reg. 1,796 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.95(b)).
24. After noting that Exec. Order No. 1229i and statutes such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act
and the Paperwork Reduction Act would not apply to the listing process, the Conference Report states
that "[t]he standards of the Act relating to the designation of critical habitat remain unchanged."
Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 835, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982). It appears that it was the
policy of the Department of Interior to comply with this executive order and these statutes in evaluating
alternative critical habitat designations at the time of the 1982 Amendments. See H.R. Rep. No. 567,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 41 (1982).
25. Douglas County v. Lujan, No. 91-6423, (D. Ore., complaint filed Oct. 4,1991) Dec. 22,1992
and Trinty County Concerned Citizens v. Lujan, No. 92-I 194 (N.H.J.)(D.D.C. complaint filed May
27, 1992). NOAA lists such designations as categorical exclusions.under NEPA. See NAO 216-6
(Aug. 6, 1991) at 12 and 49 Fed. Reg. 29,652 (1984). Nonetheless environmental assessments were
prepared for two recent proposals for the designations of critical habitat. 57 Fed. Reg. 36,626 (1992).
57 Fed. Reg. 57,051 (1992).
26. Compare the definitions of "destruction or adverse modification" and "jeopardize the
continued existence of" in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1990). Several cases have discussed critical habitat, but
in most situations agency actions were viewed as both jeopardizing the continued existence of the
species as well as destroying or adversely modifying habitat. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, and Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'gdented 532 F.2d 1375, cert. denied 429
U.S. 979 (1976).
27. In a series of palila bird cases, courts interpreted the prohibition on taking in a manner that
appears to provide redundant protection for critical habitat. The plaintiffs in these cases argued that
the adverse modification of a species' habitat constituted a taking under Section 9 of the ESA.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that state-authorized grazing by feral sheep and goats in the habitat
area of the endangered palila bird was illegal. This claim was upheld. Critical habitat was not
designated for the palila bird; even if designated, the Section 7 critical habitat protections would not
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habitat provides for little or no additional protection has been criticized by
commentators."'
In some cases, the economic impact of critical habitat designation,
apart from the impact of the listing and other protections provided for the
species, can be expected to be minimal.2 9 For example, the final listing of
the Steller sea lion as a threatened species under the ESA also prohibited
shooting at these animals and provided for a three-mile no-approach buffer
area around certain key rookery sites in order to protect the animals from
unauthorized takings."0 Another rule restricted trawl fishing around key
rookeries to conserve the species and to ensure that commercial fishing was
not likely to jeopardize the species' continued existence. 31 The three-mile
buffer and ten-mile no-fishing zones may have significant economic
repercussions, but these are consequences of regulations to prevent takings
of Steller sea lions and to ensure agency actions will not jeopardize this
species. The economic impacts are not the result of critical habitat
designations; critical habitat has not been designated for this species.
While economics must be considered in designating critical habitat, the
relevance and importance of economics in the designation process may be
limited.
have applied to the state's actions unless there was some federal involvement. See Palila v. Hawaii Dept
of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir
198 1), and Palila v. Hawaii Dep't. of Land and Natural Resources, 649 F Supp. 1070 (D. Hawai
1986), aff'd 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
28. See D. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION, 151-152 (1989) (regulatory interpretation is "greatly in error").
29. See the proposed designation of critical habitat for winter-run chinook salmon in the
Sacramento River. 57 Fed. Reg. 36,626 (1992). NMFS concluded that "[t]he economic and other
impacts resulting from this critical habitat designation, over and above those arising from the listing of
the species under the ESA, are expected to be minimal." Id. See also the proposed designation of
critical habitat for Snake River sockeye salmon, Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon and
Snake River fall chinook salmon at 57 Fed. Reg. 57,051 (1992).
In contrast, FWS in the final designation of critical habitat for the northern spotted owl "assumed
that of the total reduction of timber sales, 70 percent would be due to listing impacts (application of the
jeopardy standards and take prohibitions) and 30 percent would be due to Timber Assessment Market
Model (TAMM) developed by the Forest Service and used to estimate the market effects of owl
protection measures." 57 Fed. Reg. 1,815 (1992). The adequacy of the economic analysis is under
litigation. Trinity County Concerned Citizens v. Lujan, No. 92-1194 (N.H.J.) (D.D.C. complaint filed
May 27, 1992). In Douglas County v. Lujan, No. 91-6424 (D. Ore., filed Dec. 22, 1992). The court
found that FWS adequately considered relevant economic issues associated with the critical habitat
designation.
30. 55 Fed. Reg. 49,204 (1990).
31. 57 Fed. Reg. 2,683 (1992) (imposed 10-mile no-trawl zones around 37 sea lion rookeries
with expanded prohibitions to 20 miles around five rookeries from January to April). See also
emergency rule at 56 Fed. Reg. 28,112 (1991).
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Jeopardy Determinations and the Mandate to Avoid Jeopardy
Once a species is listed under the ESA, the mandatory provisions of
Section 7(a) (2) apply 32 Federal agencies are required to ensure that their
actions are not likely tojeopardize the continued existence of listed species.
Similarly, once critical habitat is designated, agencies must avoid the
destruction or adverse modification of these areas. The no-jeopardy
obligation and the duty to avoid destruction or modification of critical
habitat are to be carried out in consultation with NMFS or FWS.33 In
making determinations under Section 7(a)(2), an agency must use "the
best scientific and commercial datar available." 4 Consequently, FWS and
NMFS do not consider economics in making jeopardy determinations as a
part of the Section 7 consultation process.8s
The Supreme Court decision in TVA v Hill indicated that economic
consequences are irrelevant to the Section 7 mandate to avoid jeopardy
"The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable. 3 6 The
Court went on to state:
Quite obviously, it would be difficult for a court to balance a sum
certain - even $100 million - against a congressionally declared
'incalculable' value, even assuming we had the power to engage
in such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not.
37
Thus, economic factors are irrelevant in making jeopardy determina-
32. Certain aspects of the Section 7 process begin with a proposed listing or critical habitat
designation. At that point, the conferencing procedures apply to certain actions by federal agencies,
and FWS or NMFS may make advisory recommendations concerning methods to minimize or avoid
adverse effects. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4).
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
35. Thus, Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(Suppl. 1992) and statutes such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988) and the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, as amended, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (1988) would not be
applicable to the issuance of biological opinions. Similarly one could argue that NEPA would not apply
to the issuance of biological opinions by the service agencies. But see FWS Guidance on the Application
of NEPA to the ESA and MMPA (Sept. 10, 1991); and 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983) (biological
opinions subject to categorical exclusion under NEPA). See also Exec. Order No. 12630, 53 Fed. Reg.
8,859 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (Suppl. 1992) and Appendix IV of the Att'y Gen's Supp.
Guidelines for the Dept. of Interior (March 29, 1989) (Takings Implications Assessment required for
most jeopardy opinions issued under the ESA). See also Att'y Gen's Supp. Guidelines for the Dept. of
Commerce (April 23, 1990).
In addition, one could argue that the role of the service agency is advisory and the final decision to
go forward with the project rests with the action agency, not FWS or NMFS (unless, of course, the
service agency is also the action agency). See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 532 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.
1976), reh'g denied 532 F.2d 1375, cert. denied 429 U.S. 979 (1976). Consequently, any obligation
under NEPA or under another statute or executive order rests with the action agency, not the service
agency.
36. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 178, (citing H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong.).
37. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 188-89.
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tions under Section 7(a)(2); likewise, the no-jeopardy mandate does not
provide for the consideration of economic factors, except in the extraordi-
nary situation where an exemption is sought from the Endangered Species
Committee.
Alternatives to Avoid Jeopardy and the Duty to Conserve
As a practical matter, economic considerations are important in the
evaluation of alternatives that are acceptable under the ESA. Normally,
economic factors are considered when an agency proposes an action, and if
applicable, economic and environmental documents are prepared as a part
of the administrative process. During consultation with FWS or NMFS,
the impact of the proposed action on endangered and threatened species
and their habitat is evaluated, and sometimes the proposed action is
modified to mitigate adverse impacts; economics factors are often consid-
ered in this process. While language in some earlier cases suggested the
duty to conserve species under Section 7(a)(1) imposed a stringent
obligation, a more recent decision indicates that there is a large degree of
latitude in fulfilling this duty if that action is consistent with a biological
opinion issued through the consultation process.38 Provided the action
agency complies with the no-jeopardy mandate and does not adversely
modify critical habitat, the action agency has considerable discretion in
choosing a preferred alternative. Economics may be considered in making
this choice.
If a biological opinion concludes that an agency action is likely to
jeopardize a listed species or to destroy or adversely modify critical habitat,
the Secretary must suggest "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to avoid
this consequence.3 9 Regulations define "reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives " as alternative actions that are "economically and technologically
feasible. ' 40 In fact, jeopardy opinions are relatively infrequent.4 ' But even
with a jeopardy opinion, nothing restricts or prohibits an agency from
considering economic factors in selecting among the acceptable reasonable
38. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990). See
also Carson-Truckee Water Conservation Dist. v. Watt, 549 F Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982), modified
741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985); and Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l
Park Service, 669 F Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
40. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1991).
41. See DONALD BERRY, LESLIE HARROUN, AND CHRISTINE HALVORSON, FOR CONSERVING
LISTED SPECIES, TALK IS CHEAPER THAN WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, 4, 9 (Feb., 1992) (during the five-year period FWS conducted 71,560
informal and 2,000 formal consultations, of which only 350 had jeopardy conclusions; during this five-
year period, NMFS conducted 788 informal and 248 formal consultations, with only three opinions
having jeopardy conclusions).
[Vol. 13
ECONOMICS AND THE ESA
and prudent alternatives. Rarely are the alternatives viewed as so costly or
undesirable that the action is "blocked" by the Section 7 process.
42
Obviously, an evaluation of cost is an important consideration in deciding
whether to cancel an action.
The Endangered Species Committee and the Exemption Process
In response to TVA v Hill, Congress created an Endangered Species
Committee, in the 1978 ESA amendments and provided a mechanism for
obtaining an exemption from the no jeopardy mandate of Section 7 AS
Economic factors are considered in the exemption process.
The exemption process begins upon application to the Endangered
Species Committee, following completion of the normal consultation
process. This Committee, sometimes referred to as the "God Squad,"
consists of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior, the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of
EPA, the Administrator of NOAA, and an individual representing the
affected state. Five members must vote in person to allow for an exemption.
Before the Endangered Species Committee grants a waiver, it must
determine, on the record that: (1) there are no reasonable and prudent
alternatives, (2) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh alternative
courses of action that would preserve the species or its critical habitat, and
the action would be in the public interest, and (3) the action is of regional or
national significance. 44 After making those determinations, the Commit-
tee is required to establish reasonable mitigation and enhancement
measures to minimize adverse effects on the species and habitat
concerned.45
Since the creation of the exemption process, the Endangered Species
Committee has voted in only three cases: the Tellico Dam project, the
Graylocks dam project, and, most recently, on certain timber sales in the
Pacific Northwest. An exemption was granted for the Graylocks project
and for a limited number of timber sales. Legislative action authorized
completion of the Tellico project. Because the exemption process has been
42. The study noted that during the five-year study period:
FWS has only positively identified 18 projects or activities that received jeopardy biological
opinions and were ultimately blocked, cancelled or terminated due to § 7. The vast majority
of the remaining jeopardy opinions applied to activities that were completed ultimately
through the adoption of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" or modifications that
avoided violating the ESA.
Id. at ii. In addition, FWS identified 35 cases pending or put on hold for unknown reasons; NMFS
identified one block action and one action on hold. Id. at 4-9.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). See 50 C.F.R. Parts 450-453 (1990).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(l)(A)(i) - (iii).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(l)(B).
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used so rarely, little information is available on how it functions. In 1991,
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) applied to the Endangered
Species Committee for an exemption concerning timber sales on 44 tracts
of land in the Pacific Northwest. According to FWS biological opinions,
these timber sales were likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the
northern spotted owl. The Secretary of Interior determined that the BLVl
application was complete, and hearings were conducted on this matter
The Endangered Species Committee issued an exemption for 13 of the 44
timber sales subject to compliance with specific mitigation requirements.
Although silent with respect to other laws and executive orders that
may require an economic analysis, the ESA indicates that an environmen-
tal impact statement must be prepared, either prior to, or as a part of the
exemption process.46
46. The ESA exemption provisions include:
An exemption decision by the Committee under this section shall not be a major Federal
action for the purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4231
et seq.): Provided, That an environmental impact statement which discusses the impacts
upon endangered species or threatened species or their critical habitats shall have been
previously prepared with respect to any agency action exempted by such order
§ 7(k) (emphasis added).
The legislative history is even more explicit. The underscored language was added by Amendment
No. 3129 to S. 2899, introduced by Senator Nelson. In response to this amendment, Senator Culver, the
sponsor of S. 2899, stated:
Mr. Culver: Madam President, if I could just say to the Senator from Wisconsin I
respect the intent of his amendment. It does seem to me difficult to imagine a situation
actually arising, however, where under the very exhaustive and elaborate consultative
processes that are required under this bill a project in irreconcilable conflict could actually
get that far along in the process without an EIS being prepared.
But I do believe the amendment essentially corresponds with the intent of the
committee, and I do not personally have any objection to it.
S. Rep. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in Cong. Research Service, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, (Comm. Print 1982) at 1026.
Senator Nelson admitted the failure to prepare an EIS would be an unusual case, even a rare case,
but noted the existence of a special exemption from the requirements of NEPA for certain dredge and
fill projects in wetlands under Pub. L. 92-500. In other cases, the requirement to prepare an EIS would
not be an additional requirement. See Id. at 1026-27
Consequently, it is argued that the Endangered Species Committee can not go forward with the
exemption process unless an adequate EIS has been prepared. See memo from Pamela Baldwin,
Congressional Research Service to Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries 6 (May 12, 1992).
In contrast, in the recent spotted owl controversy, Counsel for the Endangered Species Committee
opined:
The exemption process was created to allow for the expeditious consideration of whether
economic factors justify exemption from the requirements of the ESA for a given action. An
interpretation of section 7(k) that would require the [Endangered Species] Committee to
conduct a review of the adequacy of environmental documentation under the provisions of
NEPA, or an interpretation that would require the Committee to conduct an EIS, clearly is
inconsistent with this purpose.
Memorandum from T. Sansonetti, Interpretation of § 7(k) with respect to the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (Apr. 28, 1992) at 8. This issue may be resolved in litigation. Portland Audobon Society
v. The Endangered Species Committee, No. 92-70436 (9th Cir. complaint filed June 11, 1992).
ECONOMICS AND THE ESA
Although the exemption process is atypical, it represents a situation
where economic considerations can be used to justify activities that may
jeopardize the continued existence of endangered and threatened species.
Recovery Plans and Management Actions
The ESA requires the Secretary to develop and implement recovery
plans.47 Timing is not specified by statute although certain priorities are
established. A high priority is specified for "species that are, or may be, in
conflict with construction or other development projects or other forms of
economic activity "48
Economic considerations are relevant to the recovery planning pro-
cess. However, it is important to distinguish between the development and
content of a recovery plan and the implementation of specific management
measures to achieve a plan's goals. With respect to the former, the
Conference Report on the 1988 Amendments states that "the development
and content of recovery plans will continue to be based solely on biological
considerations. 49
Recovery plans are to include "site-specific management actions" and
"estimates of the time and costs required to carry out those measures
needed to achieve the plan's goal and to achieve intermediate steps toward
that goal."150 NMFS or FWS is responsible for the development and
implementation of a recovery plan for a listed species, although the
responsibility for many of the specific management actions and conserva-
tion measures may rest with other agencies, with the Service acting in a
consulting capacity
A recovery plan is subject to public notice and an opportunity for
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A).
49. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-928, 100th Cong., 2d Sess (1988), printed in 134 CONG. REC.
H7,719 (1988). See also floor debate concerning Amendment 2724, a proposal to require a
comprehensive economic analysis as a part of a new or revised recovery plan. 134 CONG. REc. S1O,165-
69 (1988). In this floor debate, Senator Mitchell argued:
It is especially critical to the scientific credibility of the endangered species program
that decisions about when to delist a species as recovered be based on the biological status of
the species, not on how much it will cost to restore its numbers or whose economic interests it
may affect.
It is essential to the act's integrity that recovery goals for the number of individuals or
populations needed to ensure a species existence be based solely on the best available
scientific data.
134 CONG. REC. S10,166 (1988). Amendment 2724 was withdrawn.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(i)(B)(i) - (iii) (emphasis added); it is not clear whether these "costs"
are limited to the actual cost of implementing specific measures or could include indirect costs and
expenses resulting from recovery efforts.
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public comment prior to final approval. 1 The issues of whether a complete
economic analysis is required and whether executive order 12291, execu-
tive order 12612, or executive order 12630, or the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, Paperwork Reduction Act or NEPA would apply to the plan, or only
when the plan is implemented is unresolved. If the plan includes only
research objectives, goals, and general recommendations, most of the
requirements and procedures of these various executive orders and acts
may be inapplicable. 2
Implementation of management actions, especially regulatory ac-
tions, probably would need an economic analysis and would be subject to
various executive orders and statutes requiring the preparation of this type
of analysis. The ESA does not specify a schedule for implementing
management measures. Management actions could be taken as a part of
the recovery planning process, or under other statutory authority 53
In general, consideration of economics and other factors may be most
important and relevant during the recovery planning process when specific
management and conservation measures are being implemented. While
the mandate to avoid jeopardy establishes a legal minimum, recovery
planning and conservation management allow more latitude. The consid-
eration of options should involve the evaluation of broader social and
economic costs and benefits as well as the narrow evaluation of the impact
on the listed species.
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Informal Economic Evaluations and the Need for an Objective
Methodology
While the law restricts the role of economics in certain decisions and
determinations under the ESA, such as the listing process, informal
economic evaluations and assessments often are conducted and pub-
lished. 54 Special interest groups often weigh the costs and benefits of a
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0(4).
52. For example, see FWS Guidance on the Application of NEPA to the ESA and MMPA
(September 10, 1991); and 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983) (recovery plans usually subject to categorical
exclusion under NEPA).
53. An action agency may utilize broad authority under the ESA in conjunction with its other
statutory authority to implement management measures. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b) and(c), 1532(3),
1533(d) and 1536(a)(1); see also the Turtle Excluder Device (TED) regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 227.72
(1990), 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (1987) (NEPA applicable and Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (SEIS) prepared, Exec. Order No. 12291 applicable but TED regulations not a "major
rule" so no regulatory impact analysis prepared, and Regulatory Flexibility Act applicable and
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and Regulatory Impact Review (RFA/RIR) prepared).
54. For example, see EUGENE H. BUCK ET AL., PACIFIC SALMON AND STEELHEAD: POTENTIAL
IMPACTS OF ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT LISTINGS (Congressional Research Serv. March 15, 1991), see
especially the section entitled "Potential Economic and Other Impacts" at 12-21.
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proposed listing. While the evaluations occur outside the formal listing
process, these groups often attempt to influence ESA decisions based on
their economic assessments.
Unfortunately, such assessments are often based on the inappropriate
use of economics, or the results of those assessments are presented out of
context. One of the most frequent errors is the use of regional economic
impact measures to represent overall implications to society resulting from
an ESA listing decision. Often costs are evaluated only in the short term
and in isolation, without consideration of associated economic benefits. In
other cases, these assessments are unsophisticated or erroneous. If, in fact,
economic factors play a role in the politics of the ESA process, then there is
an obvious need for a rational application of economic analysis to ESA
decisions, using a comprehensive and consistent approach.
As suggested in Section II, even though economic factors can not
legally influence the decision to list a species or the obligation to avoid
jeopardy, the ESA provides for the consideration of these factors in the
designation of critical habitat, and perhaps more importantly, in the
implementation of recovery planning and specific management measures.
In the case of Columbia River salmon, for example, an economic analysis
would explore the costs and benefits associated with alternative actions to
promote recovery such as habitat protection, efforts to maximize natural
spawning and promote propagation, and river management measures to
facilitate upstream and downstream migration.
In terms of economic efficiency, the objective is to promote the
recovery of the salmon resource at minimum economic cost to society For
example, certain minimum river flows maybe essential for the survival of
listed salmon. Additional flows may promote recovery In evaluating the
efficacy of flows, the survival of juvenile fish and other environmental and
economic benefits resulting from increased flows must be evaluated in the
context of additional environmental and economic (or opportunity) costs.
These costs would include direct capital, operation, and maintenance costs,
as well as the opportunity costs of removing resources from existing uses.
More specifically, these costs might include the loss of hydro-electric
energy production resulting from increased flows, and would require
production from alternative energy sources, such as increased reliance
upon fossil fuels, nuclear, solar, geothermal, wind power generation, or
energy conservation techniques. 55 If these costs are overlooked and
economic efficiency is neglected in the implementation of the recovery
plan, or other management actions to promote recovery, it is doubtful if the
55. Columbia River hydropower production provides electricity equal to the needs of 12 cities
the size of Seattle; completely replacing this power capacity would require 15-20 coal fired or nuclear
plants.
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objective will be achieved at a minimum economic cost to society
Measuring Economic Implications
There are four types of economic evaluation that may be applied to
endangered species recovery decisions. They are, in order of decreasing
economic analytical sophistication: (1) benefit-cost analysis, (2) cost-
effective analysis, (3) cost-sensitive analysis, and (4) cost-oblivious analy-
sis.5" An initial decision must determine which of these models is most
appropriate, given the environmental conditions, knowledge about the
effectiveness of the actions, and the implicit budget constraints for carrying
out the specified goals. From an economic perspective, the benefit-cost
model is the most sophisticated and appropriate analysis for most situa-
tions. The other models represent alternatives in an imperfect economic
world; the biases and omissions of these models must be noted in any
assessment or evaluation.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
A benefit-cost analysis (B/C) is a classical, fully monetized approach
to measuring social welfare of development plans. It is the preferred
alternative when economic efficiency is the major concern. B/C is best
carried out in a "with versus without" framework to determine the social
welfare implications of a proposed undertaking.
Many biologists and environmentalists are persuaded that B/C has no
place in wildlife management planning because of the difficulty of
attaching dollar values to non-market resources. For example, it may be
difficult to place an economic value on aesthetic considerations or a species'
continued existence.
57
Nonetheless, B/C has a place in the evaluation of projects that are
unaffected by the ESA or other legislative mandates or where wildlife
concerns are of secondary importance. In addition, B/C is appropriate in
evaluating conservation and recovery efforts that are economically
motivated.
Cost-Effective Modelling
Cost-effective modelling generally is appropriate when applied to
56. Norman K. Whittlesey and Philip R. Wanderschneider, An Economist's View of Salmon
Recovery: The Case of the Columbia River Basin at 7 (1990) (Unpublished manuscript available in
authors files). See also W Yallup, et. al., Making Economic Information More Useful for Salmon
and Steelhead Production Decisions at 4 (1984) (NOAA Tech. Memorandum NMFS F/NWR-8);
Norman K. Whittlesey and Philip R. Wanderschneider, Salmon Recovery as Viewed by Two
Economists, 2 CHOICES 3 (1992).
57 For example, see BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY 9 (1987).
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legislatively determined goals where there are alternative means for
achieving that goal. Following this paradigm, the specific goal or project
benefits have been evaluated through the political process and found to be
worth undertaking. Cost-effective modeling avoids the need to evaluate
benefits (especially for non-market resources) by establishing the desired
objective a priori and by searching for the lowest cost methods for
achieving this objective. This model facilitates comparisons among availa-
ble alternatives. For example, this approach would provide a mechanism to
eliminate options that cost more than equally and more efficient alterna-
tives, or to eliminate options that cost the same but are not as efficient as
other alternatives.
A cost-effective model may be particularly useful in evaluating
acceptable alternatives to avoid a jeopardy situation. In addition, a cost-
effective model may facilitate comparisons among alternative recovery
options. This approach would allow decision makers to build a "frontier" of
cost-effective actions that would highlight the marginal costs associated
with additional recovery efforts. At some point, the small increase in




Cost-sensitive analysis is generally less restrictive than the two
previous models and may better describe the process of meeting the goals of
maintaining environmental quality and protecting wildlife. It is assumed
that the goals have been legislatively determined but there are some
alternatives for their achievement. Also, there may be some politically
motivated budget constraints that implicitly influence the choice of action.
Choices frequently will be based on biological or politically determined
criteria but, where alternatives are equally satisfactory in terms of these
criteria, economic efficiency can play a role. Similar to cost-effective
modelling, a cost-sensitive analysis may be useful in evaluating alterna-
tives that are equally satisfactory in avoiding a jeopardy situation.
Cost-Oblivious Analysis
Finally, a cost-oblivious approach may be used to address societal
issues. In this case a goal has been politically established that is so extreme
that there is no room for alternative paths of action or concern about
economic efficiency 59 This approach is appropriate in listing decisions
58. See J.B. Hyman and K Wemstedt, The Role of Biological and Economic Analysis in the
Listing of Endangered Species, 104 RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 5 (1991).
59. Whittlesey and Wanderschneider, supra note 55 (manuscript at 7).
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under the ESA. The statute and legislative history indicate that a decision
that a species is "endangered" or "threatened" should be based on
biological data and should not be influenced by economic considerations.
This approach is also appropriate in decisions concerning whether an
action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a species. These are
biological decisions and there is no room in the decision-making process to
consider B/C or social welfare functions.
The cost-oblivious model, however, is not required for other decisions
in the ESA process. In terms of ensuring the survival of a endangered or
threatened species, there are usually alternatives or choices that avoid
jeopardizing the species and that allow for a cost-effective or cost-sensitive
approach. In terms of providing for the recovery of these species and in
providing for special management measures, even greater latitude is
generally available, and a cost-effective analysis appears most appropriate.
In special cases, such as an application to the Endangered Species
Committee, or where economic considerations are of paramount impor-
tance, a B/C analysis may be most appropriate.
IV SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
This article outlined the situations where economic assessments play a
role in the ESA process and discussed four economic evaluation tech-
niques. Economic considerations are not relevant to the ESA listing
process. Likewise, economic impacts are not considered in making jeop-
ardy or adverse modification determinations; and, except in extraordinary
circumstances, economic considerations may not be used to excuse
compliance with the duty to avoid agency actions that are likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. In the rare case
where an application for an exemption is submitted to the Endangered
Species Committee, economic factors are considered in determining
whether to allow an action that is likely to result in jeopardy or in the
destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.
Three other ESA actions include the consideration of economic
consequences. First, economic impacts must be considered in the designa-
tion of critical habitat, although the relevance and importance of econom-
ics at this stage of the ESA process may be limited. Second, the
consideration of economics is important in evaluating options that are
available to avoid jeopardy Where two or more alternatives exist that
would comply with the mandates of the ESA, it is appropriate to consider
economics in choosing between them. Finally, economic considerations
may be especially relevant and important during the later stages of the
ESA process and should be considered during recovery planning process
and in implementing management actions and conservation measures.
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Economic considerations are not ignored by the ESA. The role of
economics, while circumscribed in some instances, is an important part of
evaluating projects that may affect listed species or their habitat, and is
valuable in the implementation of recovery actions. If economic factors are
considered, a systematic and rational approach is encouraged. Decisions
should be based on a comprehensive economic analysis that is used in a
consistent, rather than an ad hoc, fashion. While some feel that biological
decisions should not be "contaminated" by economic considerations, a
faulty economic analysis may pose an even greater threat to the integrity of
the ESA.

